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The Economic Realities of 
Replacing the Affordable Care Act
Hanming Fang, PhD
The Affordable Care Act (ACA), or Obamacare, has had a transformational 
effect on the individual market for health insurance in the United States and 
specifically for people with pre-existing health conditions.
Over 12 million people signed up for 2016 insur-
ance coverage on one of the new exchanges created 
by the law. And along with an expansion of Medicaid 
eligibility that 31 states have adopted1—another key 
element of the ACA—over 22 million Americans have 
acquired health insurance since 2013. But the program 
has failed to meet many of its enrollment targets, and 
the combination of narrow networks2 and higher than 
anticipated premiums have made it difficult for some 
people to realize the benefits of their coverage, par-
ticularly when paired with high deductibles. Others 
remain financially burdened by the requirement to 
purchase minimum coverage in the individual market-
place, despite the fact that an overwhelming majority 
of those insured through exchanges received federal aid 
in the form of insurance subsidies.3 Republicans have 
been attempting to undo the law, either in whole or in 
part, essentially since its inception, citing the ACA’s 
high costs and lack of “universal access”—a common 
party term, not to be confused with the Democrats’ 
health insurance goal of “universal coverage.” 
After numerous repeal attempts (and one veto) 
during the Obama Administration’s tenure, both the 
Senate and House passed budget resolutions in early 
SUMMARY
• This Issue Brief uses a new economic model to empirically 
examine the pivotal mechanisms of the Affordable Care Act, 
such as the individual mandate, employer mandate, and pre-
mium subsidies, to inform the current debate over repealing 
and replacing the ACA.
• Simulations based on the model suggest that the ACA, if left 
intact, in the long run significantly reduces the uninsured rate 
among workers in the estimation sample to below 4 percent.
• Interestingly, the simulations also suggest that the employer 
mandate is not a crucial pillar for the success of the ACA. In 
an ACA scenario without that mandate, the uninsured rate 
would be only slightly higher than the uninsured rate under 
the full ACA.
• The analysis indicates it is the premium subsidy, rather than 
the employer mandate or the individual mandate, that is crucial 
for the success of the ACA, in terms of expanded coverage.
• The brief concludes with a look at the key elements of the main 
legislative proposals Congressional Republicans have offered 
to replace the ACA, including the American Health Care Act.
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January to draft repeal bills for the 
ACA through the budget reconcili-
ation process. Through this process, 
Republicans have the power to elimi-
nate and replace any provision of the 
ACA that costs the federal govern-
ment money, like premium subsidies, 
without requiring any Democratic 
votes. To achieve a complete overhaul 
of the ACA, however, several Demo-
crats would have to support a new, 
comprehensive law, which is unlikely 
for a variety of reasons that are beyond 
the scope of this Issue Brief. Repub-
lican legislators nevertheless are now 
debating the merits of several detailed 
replacement plans that have been 
introduced within the last two years. 
Some of these plans may increase 
the number of people who receive 
insurance, which is a frequently stated 
goal of President Donald Trump, 
despite its being at odds with estab-
lished Republican policy priorities.4 
Other policymakers have crafted 
proposals that significantly scale back 
aspects of the current law, such as the 
Medicaid expansion or the creation 
of insurance exchanges. The recently 
released House Republican budget 
reconciliation, titled the American 
Health Care Act (AHCA), retains 
some of the most popular features of 
Obamacare as it still allows young 
adults to stay on their parents’ plans 
until they reach age 26, and prohibits 
insurance companies from denying 
coverage to individuals with pre-exist-
ing health conditions. But it com-
pletely repeals the employer mandate 
of the ACA. The individual mandate 
of the ACA is also repealed; instead, it 
incentivizes young and healthy indi-
viduals to buy insurance with a con-
tinuous coverage requirement in order 
to avoid being charged a premium 
penalty (see Table 1).  It also replaces 
the income based premium tax credit 
under the ACA with an age/income 
based refundable tax credit. Signifi-
cantly, it will change Medicaid into 
a block grant program starting from 
2020. Notably, the insurance exchange 
and the essential benefit requirements 
for qualified insurance plans, two ACA 
features, remain as key components of 
the AHCA. As expected, the new act 
has stirred significant opposition both 
from the Democrats and conservative 
Republicans, for very different reasons.
This Issue Brief uses new research 
on the labor and health insurance 
market dynamics of the ACA to 
empirically dissect the pivotal mecha-
nisms of Obamacare and identify 
their effects, thus shedding some 
much-needed light on the repeal-
and-replace debate. It also provides a 
model to examine what health insur-
ance coverage in the U.S. could look 
like in the long run (i.e., after the 
markets have a chance to settle into 
a new steady state in response to the 
provisions of the ACA) in the absence 
of repeal. Understanding the effects 
of specific elements of the ACA, such 
as the individual mandate and pre-
mium subsidies, is crucial to predict-
ing the effects of any policy that seeks 
to replace all or part of the current 
system. This Issue Brief illustrates 
in summary-level detail the impact 
of these ACA elements, including 
some of the often-neglected benefits 
of expanded coverage, especially to 
employers, which policymakers should 
consider in all of their upcoming 
debates over costs and the streamlin-
ing of operations.
MODELING OBAMACARE: THE 
LABOR MARKET AND THE 
UNINSURED
There is a brand new model that 
integrates both the labor and health 
insurance markets in order to both 
qualitatively and quantitatively evalu-
ate the impacts of the key components 
of the ACA, including the individual 
mandate, the employer mandate, the 
insurance exchanges, and the income-
 1  “Current Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions,” 
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, January 1, 2017, 
http://kff.org/health-reform/slide/current-status-of-the-
medicaid-expansion-decision/. Notably, Vice President 
Mike Pence, formerly the Governor of Indiana, was one of 
ten Republican governors to expand Medicaid coverage in 
their respective states.
 2  “Exchange Plans Include 34 Percent Fewer Providers 
than the Average for Commercial Plans,” Avalere, July 
15, 2015, http://avalere.com/expertise/managed-care/
insights/exchange-plans-include-34-percent-fewer-
providers-than-the-average-for-comm.
 3  Robert Pear, “86 Percent of Health Law Enrollees Receive 
Subsidies, White House Says,” New York Times, March 
10, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/us/11-
7-million-americans-have-insurance-under-health-act.
html?_r=0.
 4  Robert Costa and Amy Goldstein, “Trump Vows ‘In-
surance for Everybody’ in Obamacare Replacement 
Plan,” Washington Post, January 15, 2017, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-vows-in-
surance-for-everybody-in-obamacare-replacement-
plan/2017/01/15/5f2b1e18-db5d-11e6-ad42-f3375f-
271c9c_story.html?utm_term=.f53544ba4a26.
 5 This model and the subsequent results come from a work-
ing paper by Naoki Aizawa and Hanming Fang entitled 
“Equilibrium Labor Market Search and Health Insurance 
Reform” (Second Version, October 2015), http://econom-
ics.sas.upenn.edu/~hfang/WorkingPaper/healthreform/
Aizawa-Fang-October14-2015.pdf. This research is 
only a first step toward understanding the mechanisms 
through which the ACA, and more generally any health 
insurance reform, may influence labor markets equilib-
NOTES
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based insurance premium subsidies, as 
well as various combinations of these 
ACA components.5 This model offers 
robust insights into the mechanisms 
through which Obamacare affects 
the labor market in a state of equi-
librium, where risk averse workers 
facing potentially significant medical 
expenditures are matched with firms 
making health insurance coverage 
decisions. The predictions generated by 
this model are largely consistent with 
the dynamics of workers’ labor market 
experience, health, health insurance, 
and medical expenditure, as well as the 
distributions of employer sizes  
and wages that are observable in the 
real data.6 
This labor market search model, 
as it is called, is a departure from its 
predecessors because it incorporates 
considerations of health and health 
insurance in the decisions of workers 
and firms.7 A model like this one is 
necessary for understanding the gen-
eral equilibrium implications of health 
insurance reform, and it is deeply 
influenced both by previous research 
and the greater contextual landscape 
of American health care. Specifically, 
the United States is unique among 
industrialized nations in that it lacks 
a national health insurance system 
and most of the nation’s working-age 
population obtains health insurance 
coverage through their employers.8 
Fortunately, there already exists an 
abundance of research showing the 
well-documented connections between 
firm sizes, wages, health insurance 
offerings, and worker  
turnovers upon which a model like 
this depends in order to be numeri-
cally estimated. 
For example, it is well known that 
firms that do not offer health insur-
ance are more likely to be small firms, 
to offer low wages, and to experience 
higher rates of worker turnover. In 
the data used in the paper, the average 
firm size was about 8.8 for employers 
that did not offer health insurance, in 
contrast to an average size of 33.9 for 
employers that did offer health insur-
ance; the average annual wage was 
$20,560 for workers at firms that did 
not offer health insurance, in contrast 
to an average wage of $29,077 at 
firms that did; and the annual separa-
tion rate of workers at firms that did 
not offer health insurance was 17.3 
percent, while it was 15.8 percent at 
firms that did.9 Moreover, workers in 
firms that offer health insurance are 
more likely to self-report better health 
than those in firms that do not offer 
health insurance. The estimated model 
is capable of replicating all the above 
empirical patterns in the US labor 
market prior to the implementation of 
the ACA.
OVERALL EFFECTS OF  
THE ACA
With all of this background knowl-
edge serving as a foundation, the 
model shows that the first interesting 
and important effect of the ACA is 
that it lessens the degree of adverse 
selection for less productive firms 
(which are more likely to be small 
firms). This levels the playing field for 
the low- and high-productivity firms 
to offer health insurance in terms of 
the adverse selection problem.10 The 
adverse selection problem decreases 
over time because of the positive effect 
of health insurance—now available 
through regulated exchanges with 
subsidized premiums—on employee 
health. However, this result (i.e., 
improved health status of the work-
force) is captured to a greater extent 
by high-productivity firms relative 
to low-productivity firms, due to 
a “retention effect.” The retention 
effect simply refers to the fact that 
high-productivity firms tend to offer 
higher wages and retain workers 
longer.11 These various effects collec-
tively generate a positive relationship 
rium. It was estimated using a selected sample of male 
and female individuals with relatively homogeneous skills 
(with no more than high school graduation, and with ages 
between 26-46), and thus the quantitative findings may 
only be valid for this population. Furthermore, though all 
effects cited here are judged to be robust qualitatively, the 
quantitative magnitudes remain subject to change after 
additional experimentation. 
 6  The steady state equilibrium of the model is characterized 
in the spirit of K. Burdett and D. Mortensen, “Wage Differ-
entials, Employer Size, and Unemployment,” International 
Economic Review 39 (1998): 257-273. The parameters 
of the model are estimated using data from Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP, 1996 Panel), 
available at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/
sipp/data.1996.html; Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS, 1997-1999), available at https://meps.ahrq.
gov/mepsweb/; and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Employer Health Insurance Survey (RWJ-EHI,1997), 
available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/HMCA/
studies/2935. 
 7  The model is based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998); C. 
Bontemps, J.M. Robin, and G. Van den Berg, “An Empirical 
Equilibrium Search Model with Continuously Distributed 
Heterogeneity of Workers’ Opportunity Costs of Employ-
ment and Firms’ Productivities, and Search on the Job,” 
International Economic Review 40 (1999): 1039-1074;  C. 
Bontemps, J.M. Robin, and G. Van den Berg, “Equilibrium 
Search with Continuous Productivity Dispersion: Theory 
and Nonparametric Estimation,” International Economic 
Review 41 (2000): 305-358. One of the most desirable 
features of the model is that it has a coherent notion of 
firm size, which allows for the satisfactory examination 
NOTES 
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between wage, health insurance, and 
firm size. They also explain why the 
health status of employees covered by 
employer-sponsored insurance plans 
(ESIs) is better than that of uninsured 
employees in the data. In fact, due to 
these effects, the incentives for firms, 
even the more productive ones, to 
offer health insurance is only slightly 
reduced in a hypothetical scenario 
where the tax exclusion of ESI premi-
ums is eliminated. 
The second important effect of the 
ACA is that, due to the availability 
of subsidized health insurance from 
the exchange, it significantly reduces 
workers’ willingness to pay for ESI. 
Since a worker now has an option 
to buy health insurance from the 
exchanges, possibly with a federal sub-
sidy if his/her income is low, he/she 
is less willing to work for a firm that 
offers ESI but with low pay. Also, the 
firms’ benefits in terms of increased 
productivity from offering ESI are also 
significantly reduced under the ACA, 
and importantly, the reduction is much 
more pronounced for the low-pro-
ductivity (and typically smaller) firms. 
This acts as a countervailing force that 
lowers the incentives of small firms to 
offer ESI.
In light of the current policy 
debates, the model can be used to 
examine the impact of the aforemen-
tioned four key components of the 
ACA. Simulations based on the model 
predict that, left intact, the ACA 
would in the long run significantly 
reduce the uninsured rate among the 
workers in the estimation sample 
from 22.34 percent in the pre-ACA 
benchmark economy to about 3.67 
percent or 3.93 percent, depending 
on whether the expanded Medicaid 
rolls are included in the risk pool of 
health insurance exchanges.12 This 
large reduction of the uninsured rate 
is mainly driven by the unemployed 
(5.13 percent of the population) 
receiving Medicaid coverage due to its 
expansion and around 17 percent of 
employed workers with relatively low 
wages participating in the insurance 
exchanges with their premiums sup-
ported by the income-based subsidies. 
The net reduction of the uninsured 
rate is smaller than the sum of 5.13 
percent and 17 percent because the 
ESI offering rate for firms with less 
than 50 workers would decrease from 
55.40 percent in the benchmark to 
46.05 percent under the ACA, which 
we further discuss below.
THE EMPLOYER MANDATE 
EFFECT
Due to the employer mandate, should 
it ever be implemented, the health 
insurance offering rate for firms with 
50 or more workers would increase 
from 92.03 percent in the benchmark 
to 98.67 percent under the ACA; 
however, the health insurance offering 
rate for firms with less than 50 work-
ers would decrease from 55.40 percent 
in the benchmark to 46.05 percent 
under the ACA. Again, the reason for 
the reduction in small firms’ ESI offer-
ing rate is that the ACA reduces the 
value of ESI for workers, particularly 
those with low income, because of the 
availability of premium-subsidized 
health insurance from the regulated 
health insurance exchanges. The size-
dependent employer mandate would 
lead to a slight increase in the fraction 
of firms with less than 50 workers, 
with a small but noticeable cluster-
ing of firms with size just below the 
employer mandate threshold of 50. 
Overall, there would be a small reduc-
tion in the fraction of employed work-
ers receiving ESI, from 82.17 percent 
in the benchmark to 79.15 percent 
under the ACA. 
Interestingly, under an ACA 
scenario without the employer man-
of the effect of the size-dependent employer mandate as 
stipulated in the ACA.
 8  According to the Kaiser Family Foundation and Health 
Research and Educational Trust (2009), more than 60 
percent of the non-elderly population in the U.S. received 
their health insurance sponsored by their employers, 
and about 10 percent of workers’ total compensation 
was in the form of ESI premiums. Full survey avail-
able at https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013/04/7936.pdf. 
 9  Based primarily on the 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foun-
dation Employer Health Insurance Survey.
 10  In this case, adverse selection refers to the likelihood that 
less healthy job candidates will seek work at a dispropor-
tionately higher rate than healthy workers, unbeknownst 
to employers, and that their poor health will be a burden 
to their new firms (i.e., lost productivity and higher cost of 
providing insurance). 
 11  A high-productivity firm offering health insurance can 
poach workers from a much wider range of firms, includ-
ing a larger fraction of workers who work in firms that 
already offer insurance and are thus healthier; in contrast, 
a low-productivity firm offering health insurance can only 
poach workers from firms with even lower productivity, 
many of which do not offer health insurance and thus have 
less healthy workers.
 12  Recall that the sample used in the analysis of this paper 
is males and females between ages 26-46 with no more 
than a high school graduation. Their uninsured rate, at 
22.34 percent, is higher than that of the overall population 
(which stood around 16 percent in that period).
 13  The individual mandate requires everyone in the U.S. to 
have health insurance that meets the law’s minimum 
NOTES 
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date, the uninsured rate would be 4.63 
percent, just slightly higher than the 
uninsured rate under the full ACA. 
Without the employer mandate on 
firms with 50 or more workers, small 
firms increase their ESI offering rate, 
and individuals without ESI also 
have stronger incentives to purchase 
insurance from the exchange. The 
simulations suggest that the employer 
mandate, surprisingly, is not a crucial 
pillar for the success of Obamacare.
THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE 
AND PREMIUM SUBSIDY 
EFFECTS
The uninsured rate in a simulation 
of the ACA without the individual 
mandate would be 7.34 percent, sig-
nificantly lower than the 22.34 percent 
under the benchmark.13 And with nei-
ther the individual nor the employer 
mandate, the uninsured rate would be 
9.22 percent. The premium subsidy 
component of the ACA would have 
drawn all of the unemployed (regard-
less of their health) and the low-wage 
employed (again regardless of their 
health) into the insurance exchange by 
itself. In fact, if the premium subsidies, 
instead of the individual mandate, 
were removed from the ACA, the 
insurance exchanges would suffer from 
an adverse selection problem so severe 
as to render them non-functioning. 
Obamacare without premium subsidies 
would only lead to a small reduction 
of the uninsured rate to 18.19 percent 
from the 22.34 percent in the bench-
mark. These results suggest that the 
premium subsidy is the key pillar for 
the success of Obamacare.
THE TAX EXCLUSION FOR ESI 
PREMIUMS EFFECT
A final simulation covers the effects  
of eliminating the tax exclusion 
for ESI premiums both under the 
benchmark and under the ACA. The 
elimination of the tax exclusion for 
ESI premiums would reduce, but not 
eliminate, the incentives of firms, 
especially the larger ones, to offer 
health insurance to their workers, and 
the overall effect on the uninsured rate 
is modest. The uninsured rate would 
increase from 22.34 percent to 35.10 
percent when the ESI tax exclusion is 
removed in the benchmark economy, 
and it would increase from 3.67 per-
cent to 6.05 percent under the ACA. 
Prohibiting firms from offering ESI 
in the post-ACA environment would 
lead to a large increase in the unin-
sured rate, which suggests that ESI 
complements, rather than hinders, the 
smooth operations of the health insur-
ance exchanges.
This is the reality of insurance 
coverage under the ACA. If the goal, 
as President Trump seems to believe, is 
to insure everyone, then it is essential 
to understand the potential and the 
inner-workings of the program that 
will be replaced, so as to learn from its 
limitations. In that case, this model 
is highly instructive. If, however, the 
goal is mere cost reduction, then it still 
behooves policymakers to fully under-
stand the benefits of expanded health 
insurance coverage, as neither side of 
the economic coin should be debated 
in isolation. The next section sheds 
more light on these benefits.
THE SOLIDIFYING SHAPE OF 
REPEAL AND REPLACEMENT
There appear to be several points of 
consensus among Republicans over 
potential reform measures. These 
include: the elimination of the explicit 
individual mandate; the elimination 
of the ACA’s essential health ben-
efits package, which is a regulation 
that requires insurers to provide ten 
universal benefits in each exchange 
plan; the elimination of the yet-to-be-
implemented employer mandate; and 
the ability to purchase exchange plans 
standards or else face a penalty when filing taxes for the 
year. Currently, the penalty is 2.5 percent of income or 
$695, whichever amount is greater. The original motiva-
tions for this mandate included compelling younger and 
healthier people to join insurance pools to bring down 
premium costs for everyone, as well as the fact that 
people without insurance who become seriously sick or 
catastrophically injured impose enormous costs for tax-
payers. Accordingly, it remains one of the most politically 
divisive elements of Obamacare. 
 14  Jonathan Gruber, “The Tax Exclusion for Employer-Spon-
sored Health Insurance”, NBER Working Paper 15766, 
http://www.nber.org/bah/2010no1/w15766.html.
 15  “Obamacare Repeal and Replace: Policy Brief and Re-
sources,” available at http://bit.ly/2IQ3TLd.
 16  The age band is the allowable range of price discrimina-
tion based on age. Under the ACA, older people can be 
charged premiums that are up to three times higher than 
those offered to younger people. The Republican propos-
als seek either to raise this cap from three to five times or 
to eliminate it entirely.
NOTES 
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across state lines. All of these mea-
sures would require new legislation 
and require (at least some) bipartisan 
approval. But there also has been sig-
nificant disagreement among Repub-
licans over other aspects of what a 
potential ACA replacement would 
look like. Five noteworthy proposals 
have thus far been introduced as leg-
islation or for open debate, and their 
primary differences are represented in 
Table 1. 
With such broad Republican 
support for eliminating the ACA’s 
individual mandate, it is interesting 
that four of these proposals include 
a more subtle mandate for younger 
and healthier individuals to purchase 
coverage. Though the details differ, a 
common element across proposals is 
the idea of a “continuous coverage” 
requirement, which typically would 
incentivize a person seeking to pur-
chase insurance on an exchange to 
have maintained some type of mini-
mum health coverage for a specific 
period of time (e.g., 63 days in the 
American Health Care Act) in order 
to avoid significantly higher premi-
ums or even outright coverage denial 
if they have a pre-existing condi-
tion (PEC). A continuous coverage 
requirement, therefore, is a policy that 
can protect consumers against insur-
ance companies denying or charging 
them much higher premiums for cov-
erage because of PECs if they have no 
lapses in coverage. This may play the 
role of the ACA individual mandate, 
albeit implicitly, to acquire coverage 
out of concern for their future selves, 
who may become seriously sick or 
injured. In other words, the require-
ment uses an individual’s risk aversion 
toward potential higher future premi-
ums against them to incentivize them 
to obtain coverage now, when they are 
still healthy. Given this policy option, 
it may be useful for future research to 
consider the role and effects of the 
current individual mandate, and to 
model and analyze how a continu-
ous coverage requirement policy, with 
specific parameters such as the length 
of the look-back period for con-
tinuous coverage requirement and the 
permissible premium hike if continu-
ous coverage is not maintained, may 
resemble or differ from this pillar of 
the ACA. In particular, it remains 
an open question whether AHCA’s 
12-month look-back period and 30% 
premium hike irrespective of the 
enrollee’s health risk provide suffi-
ciently strong incentives for the young 
and the healthy to buy insurance. In 
addition, continuous coverage require-
ment works only if consumers are 
sufficiently forward looking, and dem-
onstrate adequate financial and health 
literacy. Thus, extensive information 
campaign and consumer educational 
outreach will be crucial. Moreover, 
there also needs to a new borrowing 
mechanism so that  credit-constrained 
consumers who experience temporary 
liquidity shocks can continue paying 
their health insurance premiums.
A second key point of disagree-
ment among these legislative propos-
als involves a potential cap on the tax 
exclusion for ESIs. After spending on 
Medicare (roughly $400 billion) and 
Medicaid (roughly $300 billion), the 
current tax exclusion for ESIs (roughly 
$260 billion) is the country’s largest 
public (tax) expenditure on health 
TABLE 1:  DIFFERENCES IN REPUBLICAN LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
 
 HHS Secretary Tom Price: Senate Finance Comm. Chair Senator Ted Cruz: House Speaker Paul Ryan: The American Health Care Act
 Empowering Patients Orrin Hatch: Health Care Choice Act “A Better Way” (2016) (2017) 
 First Act (2015) Patient CARE Act (2015) (2015)   
“Continuous Coverage” Requirement - Included (18 Months of Included (18 Months of None (Repeals All ACA Included (Unspecified Included (No More Than 63 Continuous 
Implicit Individual Mandate  Coverage Required Prior Coverage Required Prior Changes to the Amount of Time Required Days of Lapsation in the 12 
 to Enrollment) to Enrollment) Individual Market)  Months Prior to Enrollment)
Cost of Not Maintaining  Up to 1.5x Higher  No Limits on Premium No Limits on Premium Unspecified 30% Premium Surcharge 
“Continuous Coverage”- Premiums for 2 Years Increases or Coverage Denial Increases or  for 1 Year 
Allowable Price Discrimination   Coverage Denial 
by Health Status   
New Age Band Limit (3x at present) - No Limit Premiums Up to 5x Higher No Limit Premiums Up to 5x Higher Premiums Up to 5x Higher 
Allowable Price Discrimination by Age  for Older Americans  for Older Americans for Older Americans
Cap on Tax Exclusions for Employer- $8,000 for Individuals; Included (Unspecified) None Included (Unspecified) None 
Sponsored Plans $20,000 for Families 
 
7TABLE 2: ACA REPLACEMENT VIA BUDGET RECONCILIATION  
  
  Age-Based Tax Credits: The New Premium Subsidies 
Increased Limits for Tax-Free Health Savings Accounts
Medicaid Reform (including Repeal of the ACA’s Expansion)
“State Innovation Grants” (i.e., High Risk Pools)
Elimination of Several Health Care Industry Taxes
Source: Obamacare Repeal and Replace: Policy Brief and Resources,” available at http://bit.ly/2IQ3TLd.
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care.14 A cap would be designed to 
incentivize workers to select plans 
that offer fewer benefits and include 
more cost-sharing, which economists 
generally endorse because cost-sharing 
helps to reduce unnecessary health 
care spending, which in turn could 
drive down costs throughout the entire 
system. Since employers are always 
vying for the best workers, they benefit 
from offering health insurance purely 
from a competitiveness standpoint. 
Currently, there is no penalty for 
offering candidates the most gener-
ous plans on the market. Employers, 
however, may view a cap as a large tax 
increase, particularly if they deem the 
ability to offer these generous plans (or 
Cadillac Plans, using Obamacare par-
lance) as a necessary means of attract-
ing top talent. However, the findings 
discussed earlier suggest that the effect 
of the magnitude of the tax exclusion 
cap for ESI premiums on the unin-
sured rate is likely to be moderate. 
Aside from these various legisla-
tive proposals, a recent white paper 
from House leadership, which was 
prepared for the five House and Sen-
ate Committees responsible for health 
care oversight, highlights critical 
replacement steps that can be enacted 
through the budget reconciliation 
process alone.15 One of these steps 
has a clear Obamacare analogue: the 
policy proposal of offsetting the cost 
of insurance from new exchanges with 
tax credits. (For a list of other note-
worthy steps recommended by House 
leadership, see Table 2. A detailed 
discussion of the merits and short-
comings of these features is beyond 
the scope of this Issue Brief.) Under 
the ACA, most people who receive 
coverage in the federal marketplace or 
from state exchanges receive subsidies 
based on their income. The cur-
rent proposal favors the idea of cost 
assistance based on age instead. This is 
perhaps because other reform propos-
als, such as increases in the age band16 
or the elimination of essential benefits 
at the discretion of insurers, likely 
would raise the cost of insurance for 
older people, who may need the sort 
of comprehensive plans that younger 
and healthier people may no longer 
be compelled to buy. But regard-
less of motivation, there again may 
be wisdom in studying the role and 
effects of the current income subsidies 
and how they may predict the effects 
of age-based tax credits, even with the 
knowledge that these proposed credits 
are notably less generous than the 
Obamacare subsidies. 
CONCLUSION
Despite the enormous and time-sensi-
tive political pressure on Congressional 
Republicans to produce replacement 
legislation for Obamacare, any pivotal 
new element of health care reform 
would benefit (prior to implementa-
tion) from the type of quantitative and 
qualitative analysis now accessible for 
the ACA. Left intact, the ACA would 
significantly reduce the uninsured 
rate among U.S. workers from 22.34 
percent in the pre-ACA economy to 
about 3.67-3.93 percent in the long 
run. Under a scenario in which the 
employer mandate is never imple-
mented, the uninsured rate would be 
only slightly higher, at 4.63 percent. 
Without the individual mandate, the 
uninsured rate would be 7.34 percent. 
And without either mandate, the unin-
sured rate would be 9.22 percent. 
If premium subsidies, instead 
of the individual mandate, were 
removed from the ACA, the insur-
ance exchanges would suffer from an 
adverse selection problem so severe 
that the exchanges would cease to 
function. Obamacare without pre-
mium subsidies would only lead to a 
small reduction of the uninsured rate 
to 18.19 percent. The uninsured rate 
would increase from 22.34 percent to 
35.10 percent if the ESI tax exclu-
sion were removed in the benchmark 
economy, and it would increase from 
3.67 percent to 6.05 percent under the 
ACA. Obamacare is not without seri-
ous flaws, including narrow networks 
and many instances of high premiums 
paired with high deductibles. Policy-
makers honestly debating repeal-and-
replacement proposals, however, would 
do well to consider both the costs and 
benefits of the current system—and to 
model new policies before implement-
ing them.
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